St. John's Law Review
Volume 44
Number 5 Volume 44, Spring 1970, Special
Edition

Article 33

Diversification by Merger in International Perspective
Hans G. Mueller

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

DIVERSIFICATION BY MERGER IN
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
HANS

G.

MUELLER*

Antitrust cases are essentially exercises in economic analysis. This is
not to say that the judges formulating the decisions are necessarily guided
by precepts derived from economic theory. It only implies that the issues
raised and the norms by which they are assessed are primarily of an economic
nature. Economic theory has had some influence on the reasoning of the
courts in a number of cases, but very often the judges have developed their
own standards as far as they were permitted by the generous or fuzzy margins
of the statutes.
The enforcement of the Sherman Act' led to a slow evolution of some
norms about industry structure and business conduct. More recently, performance data were brought in to some extent, largely in order to furnish
evidence about the success or failure of certain types of conduct. The wording of the Sherman Act would have made it possible to prevent mergers of
non-leading firms, but the courts did not see it this way. However, when in
the late 1940's Congress urged them to apply stricter standards in such
situations, the courts did not hesitate to do so in subsequent decisions. In
fact, they seem to be as much, or more, guided by the new Act's 2 legislative
history as by its wording.
The authors of the new legislation were definitely concerned over the
clustering of economic power.3 Probably because they did not have a clear
idea as to the proper approach to the problem, they provided vague textual
clues for the application of the Act to mergers where the issue was not increased power in one market but the leverage afforded to gross economic
power.
It does indeed take some heroic abstractions to show that the degree of
competitiveness in a given market is not merely a function of market-share
percentages but that it is also affected by business power wielded across
industry lines. Economic theory sheds little light on this problem. The few
terms which describe competitive relations among different markets were,
for the most part, derived from the study of economic institutions, not of
pure theory. Therefore, in merger cases involving such relations the judges
were compelled to develop their own standards. Emphasis was placed on
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1 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
2 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).

3 J. NARVER, CONGLOMERATE MERGERS AND MARKET COMPETITION ch. 3 (1967); Blair,
Conglomerate Mergers-Theory and Congressional Intent, in PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD
MERGERS 179-96 (J. Weston & S. Peltzman eds. 1969); Keyes, Proposals for the Control of
Conglomerate Mergers, 34 S. ECON. J. 70-71 (1967).
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maintaining two particular aspects of competition, opportunity for entry
and freedom from coercion. Competitiveness and long-run social and economic performance were generally not considered to be incongruous standards. 4 The existence of a serious conflict between the two standards and
thus the need to weigh "trade-offs" has not been recognized.
To a number of students of antitrust, both lawyers and economists, this
approach seemed too simplistic. In particular, these critics hold that in
some of the merger cases decided by the courts, a higher degree of competitiveness might foreclose opportunities for a more efficient use of resources, that anticipated "economies" should therefore be taken into account,
if not by the courts, then at least by the enforcement agencies which select
cases for litigation, and that undue prohibition of mergers would lead to
social losses.5
SOME FOREIGN PARALLELS

Elements of the idea that a society's performance might improve following the curtailment of competition can be found in Plato's Republic, the
policies of mercantilistic statesmen, and, more recently, studies about economic development and market integration. Modern analysis of the problem is usually couched in terms of economies-of-scale requirements: the
tendency towards cost reductions through economies reaped from large
scale production, marketing, research and development, and advanced managerial methods (such as systems analysis), would militate against the demand
for competitive industry structure since the markets of most nations would
not accommodate more than one or at best a few firms of efficient size. The
argument has been used in support of central economic planning, export
subsidization, and, especially in western Europe and Japan, in the defense
of the creation or restoration of giant industrial and financial combinations. 6 In the latter areas the claim for future efficiencies was not restricted
to concentration achieved by merger or stock ownership. Antitrust laws
there condone cartel arrangements which have the objective to improve, in
one way or another, the efficiency of participants. 7 If one bothers to listen,
4 A conflict of this type is implied by the statement of the Supreme Court in Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 345 (1962), that "retail outlets of integrated companies, by eliminating wholesalers and by increasing the volume of purchases from the
manufacturing division of the enterprise, can market their own brands at prices below
those of competing independent retailers." Apart from the fact that the statement is
based on an unverified hunch, implying inefficiency on the part of the wholesalers, it
remains to be seen to which extent this line of reasoning will emerge in future merger
cases.
5 See, e.g., Areeda, Structure-Performance Assumptions in Recent Merger Cases, in
PUBLIC POLICY TOWARDS MERGEaS 27-44 (J. Weston & S. Peltzman eds. 1969); Bork, The
Goals of Antitrust Policy, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 242-53 (1967); Williamson, Allocative Efficiency and the Limits of Antitrust, 59 AM. ECON. REv. 105-18 (1969); Williamson, Economics
as an Antitrust Defense, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 30-36 (1968).
6J. MOLSBERGER, ZWANG ZUR GROSSE? Part III (1967); C. YANAGA, BIG BUSINESS IN
JAPANESE POLITICS

159, 167 (1968).

7D. MCLACHLAN & D. SWANN,

COMPETITION POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

chs.
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plausible arguments can also be heard from proponents of "stabilization"
cartels which are usually of more impressive scope than efficiency or "rationalization" cartels.
At any rate, belief in the superior efficiency of large combinations has
rarely been subjected to critical examination in the areas mentioned. More
recently, however, it was strengthened by the impact which the swift- and
large-scale overseas operations of American giants had on foreign business
communities. 8 A feeling of inferiority arose there, particularly with respect
to the research and development capabilities and the immense financial
reserves at the disposal of the American rivals. In Japan many of the links
which had been severed during the occupation were reestablished following
the revision of certain clauses in the Anti-Monopoly Law. On the European
continent an impulse for the structural reorganization of industries had
already been provided by the integration of national markets beginning in
the early 1950's, when the European Coal and Steel Community was established. For example, the consolidation of French steel producers into larger
units in anticipation of stepped-up competition from the German industry
took place even before this supranational arrangement came into being.
Indeed, the French government, which often played the part of a promoter
in combination schemes, did not even seem to consider the problem of tradeoffs. Convinced that French firms were too small to compete effectively with
rivals from within and without the Common Market, and playing down any
fears about potential ill-effects of concentration, it held out the lure of
subsidies to nudge reluctant businessmen into action. The need for patriotic
forces to brace themselves, by way of merger, against alien invaders was
more recently impressed upon business executives in other Common Market
countries as well.
Domestic markets were not only being swamped by merchandise produced in other nations, but foreign firms, mostly American, were establishing
an awesome presence on the home ground by building or expanding subsidiaries or by absorbing local firms. In response to this invasion, European
businesses initiated a wave of "defensive" mergers, generally with the approval of national and supranational authorities.
7, 8 (1967); C. YANAGA, BIG BUSINESS IN JAPANESE POLITICS ch. 6 (1968); Zimmermann, Das
Kartellrecht der Montanunion, 8 ZEITSCHIuFT FUR RECHTSVERGLFICHUNG 205-20 (1968).
s The literature on the subject is voluminous and the background for the summary
of problems in the remaining part under this subtitle was provided by many sources.
Considering-:the general purpose of this discussion, and to avoid over-footnoting, it was
held unnecessary to provide a reference for each of the points listed. The following
sources were drawn on for information more than others, in addition to those, cited in
notes 4 and 5 supra: J. DUNNING, THE ROLE OF AMERICAN INVESTMENT IN THE BRITISH
ECONOMY (1969); R. HELLMANN, AMERIKA AUF DEM EUROPAMARKT (1966); E. MCCREARY,
THE AMERICANIZATION OF EUROPE (1964); T. SCITOVSKY, ECONOMIC THEORY AND WESTERN
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (1958); D. SWANN & D. MCLACHLAN, CONCENTRATION OR COMPE-

EUROPEAN DILEMMA? (1967); Maule, Antitrust and the Takeover Activity of
American Firms in Canada, 11 J. LAW & ECON. 423-32 (1968); Miles, The International
Corporation, 45 INT'L AFF. 259-68 (1969).
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One may speculate about the extent to which concentration abroad,
especially in Europe, was caused indirectly by peculiarities in the enforcement of antitrust laws in the United States. In the first place, it may be
claimed that the per se prohibition of overt collusion and of various types
of common action accelerated the trend toward the formation of huge
tight-knit combinations in this country which competed against smaller
Japanese and European corporations in the world market. Secondly, the
dramatic tightening, after 1950, of the enforcement standards with regard
to horizontal mergers may have been in part responsible for the deflection
of market extension projects by dominant American firms from the United
States to Canada, western Europe, and other areas. It goes without saying
that other factors also played a role in this development, such as different
rates of economic growth and labor compensation and, in the case of the
European Economic Community (EEC), the removal of internal barriers to
trade, together with the creation of a common tariff wall around the area's
periphery.
By itself, the percentage of the manufacturing sector in Western Europe
which is controlled by American interests should not give rise to fears of
outside domination. It amounts to about 8 percent of total manufacturing
assets, although for individual member nations of the EEC (e.g., the Benelux
countries) and for Great Britain the rates are significantly higher. What
caused alarm and often a hostile public reaction, however, was the swiftness,
vigor, and selectivity which characterized the invasion. Incidentally, some of
the criticisms (but also eulogies) which have been voiced about this phenomenon have a certain affinity with those evoked by the conglomerate
merger wave in the United States. Thus, it is usually not the individual case
which causes concern but the avalanche effect of the process, i.e., its speed
and aggregate or cumulative proportions. Uneasiness has been expressed in
particular about the possibility of an adverse impact on local competition
and social conditions, and the non-availability of appropriate legal remedies.
The regions affected by the foreign operations of international firms are
often national markets. Since there is usually little mobility of factors and
firms between such "regions," a sudden structural change would give rise to
more severe disturbances than would ensue from a similar event in an open
region, such as a geographical submarket in the United States. On the other
hand, in a closed national market a take-over by foreign interests of large
firms in key sectors of the economy can be prevented by government intervention. Such action may however, be counterproductive in the Common
Market. The hostile attitude evinced by the French government toward
multi-national mergers merely caused American companies to look for
acquisitions "on the other side of the river," that is, in Germany or the
Benelux countries. In this fashion, the output of these companies would
have access to the French market, whereas a large portion of the value,
which might be added by post-merger expansion, would accrue to nationals
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in other member nations. As is true of many other problems encountered
by the EEC, effective action can frequently come about only through the
adoption of uniform policy measures. But member nations of the EEC,
like the states in this country, find it hard to agree on any common course
of action, which may also adversely affect their respective rates of economic
growth. A uniform EEC policy toward the attempts of foreign groups to
establish a dominant presence in domestic markets is not yet in sight.
It has also been claimed that foreign subsidiaries of American firms
are under excessively tight control by the parent company in the United
States. The decisions made at company headquarters are said to disregard
the policy objectives pursued by the governments of the subsidiaries' host
countries. Moreover, while American firms operating abroad usually take
great pains to observe the written laws of the land to the letter, they are
sometimes insensitive to the mores and codes of ethical conduct observed in
foreign nations. Finally, there are fears that the American government might
take measures which, although aimed at its balance-of-payments or national
security problems, may in some way or other affect the selection of policies
available to American business operations abroad. Such measures might,
for example, affect the capital outflow required for the funding of overseas
expansion projects, exports by the subsidiaries to the Communist bloc, and
the use of advanced technology in joint ventures with foreign firms.
Among the arguments heard abroad in support of American entry in
foreign markets the most plausible is that in some industries, where existing
managements have become accustomed to the "quiet life," the advent of a
dynamic newcomer might be equivalent to a fresh breeze entering musty
accommodations. Moreover, the entry might lead to economies resulting
from the introduction of new methods of mass production, common or
complementary characteristics found in the production and marketing of
different product lines, the consolidation of research and development efforts,
and transfers of managerial and financial expertise. It is by no means
certain, however, that the division of labor across product lines or geographical markets will improve the long-run performance of the diversifying firm
and its emulators. If excessive specialization has certain drawbacks, so does
excessive diversification. The central management of a large, diversified
concern may be too cautious and heavy-footed to make apt decisions when
swift action is required. Or, preoccupied with financial problems, expansion
schemes, personnel conflicts, and the direction of major divisions, it may
pay scant attention to the needs of the smaller, outlying branches.9
9 For example, Sperry Rand's take-over of a typewriter firm in Germany proved a
complete failure. J. MOLSBERGER, supra note 6, at 138-39, cites the following commentary
on this case by Heinz Brestel, A Gold Mine Gambled Away, the End of the Torpedo
Works, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, November 30, 1966.
The Americans defend their policy with the argument that the Sperry-Rand
Concern, which was welded together in 1955, needed a decade to become fully
consolidated. During this period of transformation the individual parts of the
firm, especially those in Europe, could not be given sufficient attention. This
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DIVERSIFICATION BY MERGER, SOME TECHNICAL ASPECTS

In Western Europe the argument is often heard that the requirements
for optimum firm size conflict with efforts to maintain competitive markets.
Reference is then made to the large size of American firms and plants without any mention of the fact that wages in manufacturing are about three
times higher in the United States, and the possibility that economies of scale
may not be entirely independent of factor cost ratios. Furthermore, it is not
always clear exactly how the consolidation of firms into a few large groups
is expected to lead to greater efficiency. Indeed, many proponents of concentration by merger (or other consolidation methods) tend to base their
arguments on concealed assumptions regarding existing imperfections in
the competitive process. Concentration is excused because it helps firms to
overcome obstacles to beneficent transfer of resources. If small, efficient
producers run into difficulties because they have problems with funding
(imperfect capital markets), marketing (the minimum efficient sales volume
exceeds by far the production optimum), or with intractable managers (imperfections in the market for managerial talent), let them be absorbed by
the giants. The latter have ample financial resources, propriatory distribution channels and often a good rapport with the most effective mass-advertising media, and a large pool of highly adaptable managers. They are thus
in a position to become clearing agencies, or intermediaries, in situations
where the market system for one reason or another has ceased to function
properly. 10 Little imagination is needed to foresee the consequences of a
rapid increase in the incidence of giant corporations assuming such selfimposed roles. The imperfect markets would be further stunted and the
firms which depended upon them for new capital, the distribution of their
output, or experienced managers, would have to look for merger partners
of their own or be forced into a quasi-captive position vis-A-vis large
customers or suppliers. In this sense, the process becomes contagious; the
point of "incipiency" is soon left behind and a trend is established toward
oligopoly or cross-market clustering of firms.
Other arguments in favor of the merger route for expansion stress the
possibility of inefficient internal growth due to discontinuities, increasing
illuminates strikingly the manner in which large mergers are carried out in the
United States. Torpedo fell victim to the ponderous way of acting by the
decision-making apparatus in the United States.
Molsberger mentions in this context also the lack of mobility and adaptability of the
large German coal and steel concerns during crises.
Similarly, the German conglomerates Krupp and Rheinstahl were pushed to the
brink of financial collapse by their knack for diversifying into sick industries. In the
United States, Amexco paid insufficient attention to the operations of its American Express Warehousing subsidiary and became involved in the salad oil scandal. There is
little reason to believe that large multimarket enterprises are always as efficient as they
are made out to be by some systems analysis enthusiasts.
10 Some economists attribute to international corporations the role of intermediaries
in the world money markets. See Despres, Kindleberger & Salant, The Dollar and World
Liquidity---A Minority View, 218 THE ECON. 526 (1966).
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costs of internal expansion, an adverse effect on prices resulting from expansion by building ("percentage effect"), and time and risk factors in achieving
access to new markets.1 It is difficult to assess, short of undertaking exhaustive research of the technical literature, to which extent these points were
derived from introspection, or "hunches," or from empirical work and,
furthermore, whether the aggregate contributions of such mergers to the
long-run efficiency of a national economy are significant. Only a few remarks
will be made here concerning their relevance to this investigation.
In most cases attracting the interest of the enforcement agencies of
antitrust laws, the acquiring company is of considerable absolute size. Tax
rules invite almost every corporation to expand through heavy reliance on
internal finance. If horizontal expansion by building is discouraged by a
slack market and acquisitions in the same direction would provoke inquiries
by the antitrust agencies, the accumulated cash could best be disposed by
entry into other product or geographical (including foreign) markets. Most
of the specialized companies competing in those other markets are using
equipment which is to some extent obsolescent. Ignoring for the moment any
external economies and such items as goodwill, trade marks, and learning
or start-up costs, it is hard to see what kind of advantage the executives of
a large corporation might expect to gain from the purchase of a partially
outdated plant. The acquisition would seem especially unwise in areas with
high labor costs since the lower initial outlay, compared to the cost of
constructing a plant "on a green field," is likely to be more than offset by
higher operating costs incurred with the older plant. It is doubtful, therefore, that pure cost considerations or financial constraints will motivate a
large firm to opt for the used article.
The "percentage-effect" argument only seems plausible with regard to
markets which are either stagnating or very small in relation to the size
required for an efficient plant. Assuming that 5 percent of total industry
capacity becomes obsolete every year, a certain amount of construction will
be required even in the absence of any increase in sales. Replacement usually
means modernization, but this piecemeal adaptation to technological
progress is often not feasible. On the other hand, if one established firm
should build a new installation to replace an obsolete plant, others may
be dissuaded from duplicating the act in the interest of maintaining a
balance between industry capacity and market demand. Similarly, the entry
by an outsider with a plant incorporating the latest technology may have a
dampening affect on any plans the established firms might have harbored
for undertaking large-scale investment projects designed to replace obsolete
capacity. In this case the entering firm may not have to resort to price
cutting at all in order to conquer a share of the stagnant market. Its new
11 Heflebower, Corporate Mergers: Policy and Economic Analysis, 77 Q.J. EcoN. 538-58
(1963); Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HARV. L REV.
1313-95 (1965).
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plant would occupy that share of total industry capacity which the older
firms conceded by not replacing worn-out plants.12
A glance at some recent mergers provides little evidence on the question
of whether, owing to inherent advantages, the merger route to diversification
is desirable or inevitable. The acquiring companies were mostly of large absolute size and probably did not lack the resources for entry by building.
Almost as a rule they absorbed the largest company operating in the market
into which they entered. Moreover, in a number of instances the acquiring
companies soon expanded the capacity of the new subsidiaries on an impressive scale. 13 Evidently they were either unaware of the percentage effect,
unconcerned about it, or confident that they could appropriate a share of
the market by methods other than price cutting as, for example, by means
of an intensive advertising campaign.
The last of the points previously mentioned deals with two interrelated
advantages of entry by merger: savings in time and reduction of risk. A
new operation requires a gestation period of several years, spanning the
time from the planning, construction, staffing, and "debugging" of a plant
to the acceptance of the product in the market. Against such a distant time
horizon, perhaps four or five years, any extrapolation of past and present
market trends is a venture into the outer boundaries of reliability. Acquiring a going firm avoids this delay and the risks connected with it. To companies which are merely on the lookout for a reasonably sound investment
but otherwise wish to play it safe, these advantages might be well worth
the inefficiencies arising from "integrating what was once an independent
enterprise into the role of a segment of a larger corporation."' 4
But apart from the risk factor, might economies not result also from the
swiftness with which know-how and resources can be transferred across industries by the acquisition method? Some corporations seem indeed to be
very adept in the use of this method for the infusion of human, material,
and financial resources into companies which for some reason suffer from
deficiencies in these factors. The possibility of a connection between these
transfer efficiencies and imperfections in factor markets has already been
noted. But, before accepting concentration as a remedy to relieve the problem, one should investigate the reasons as to why the market mechanism
failed to impel the various resources toward the opportunities existing in
those other industries. Perhaps the inadequate mobility of these factors of
production in the direction of smaller firms is itself attributable, in part at
least, to the excessive concentration of industry. In other words, the large
firms have foreclosed a good part of the available managerial talent, capital,
12 A similar situation is discussed by T. SciTOVSKY, supra note 8, at 123-30.
ia Especially General Foods-S.O.S., Scott Paper-Hollingsworth, Union Carbide-Visking,

and Reynolds Metals-Arrow Brands. Arrow did, however, engage in price cutting subsequent to the merger. The FTC dockets are summarized in J. NARVER, Supra note 3, at
84-89.
14 Heflebower, supra note 11, at 554.
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and distribution and advertising facilities to their smaller competitors in
these markets. The process provides its own momentum, as each merger
deprives some companies of a supplier or a customer and, in all likelihood,
induces additional mergers. Under these conditions, the advocacy of further
absorption of the small by the large is tantamount to the inference that the
residual factor markets are no longer workable and their original function might as well be assumed, in its entirety, by the large firms.
There are several other effects of diversification by merger. The benefits they entail, however, are probably more of a strictly private nature, i.e.,
they are limited to the participants of the act and will not be diffused to
other businesses or the general public. A large, stable company may experience an increase in its earnings stock-prize ratio following the absorption of a small, specialized firm; conversely, the owners of the latter may
welcome the chance to convert uncertain future earnings into capital gains.
Both parties will probably extract some tax advantages from the deal. Certain other consequences of the merger, which are probably beneficial from
the viewpoint of the expanding company but not that of the public, are
related to the firm's opportunities to extend to the newly entered market
the power it already holds in other markets. These opportunities can be
expected to be proportional to the absolute wealth over which the acquiring
15
company has command.
DIFFERENCES IN

THE

SOCIAL AND POLITICAL MATRIX

Opinions about the effects of concentration on business performance
are divided. To those observers of industrial organization who consider a
firm's progressiveness to be a function of its size, a wave of conglomerate
mergers might seem a wholesome cleansing operation that would leave the
national economy with fewer, more streamlined, and perhaps more vigorously competing enterprises. Other students of the process are troubled
by the prospect of a situation where the same large corporations will be
encountered in nearly every market, while small firms will be assigned the
role of semi-captive suppliers or distributors. In the former view, the influence of the giants in a given market is expected to be no larger than that
which is derived from their share of that market. In the latter, they are
seen as juggernauts which, for fear that aggressive action in one market
will be met by reprisals in others, will evolve the rationale of firms in a
tight oligopoly.
Whatever the outcome of an unrestrained combination avalanche,
questions arising about its effects on performance cannot be answered entirely by means of abstract theoretical models. The social organization, the
15 See, e.g., Blair, The Conglomerate Merger in Economics and Law, 46 GEO. L.J.
672-700 (1958); Merger Policy Statement by the Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust
Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Before the House Ways and Means Committee,
House of Representatives on March 12, 1969, in THE JOURNAL OF REPRINTS FOR AN ITRUST
LAW AND ECONOMIcS 201-12 (1969).
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elan and spirit of a nation, may be important co-determinants of the resulting situation, no matter whether firms will subsequently act independently, in parallel, or through cartels. In the Soviet Union, for example,
the degree of competitiveness between the Kombinats is of a somewhat
lower order than that among different divisions of a large capitalistic enterprise. The large Japanese and European companies have traditionally tended
to train their competitive energies towards foreign markets, although in the
European Common Market it has become increasingly difficult to maintain
discipline within the ranks of national industries. In some countries, industrial empires are managed by government technocrats; in others by a private
bureaucratic elite; in still others they are partially controlled by the financial wizards of leading banks. For the United States the "best" system may
be one which is marked by cross-sectional variety and continuous change,
similarly as described by Nelson, Peck, and Kalacheck in connection with
the output of inventions:
The optimum is a size distribution composed of small, medium, and
large firms varying from industry to industry and from time to time.
The optimum must further include a rate of turnover among firms sufficient to accommodate enough new firms to prevent excessive traditionalism.16
An international comparison of performance presents many problems
and cannot be attempted here. From a perusal of the technical press only
a superficial impression can be gained of the achievements made by the
economies mentioned. The concentrated Soviet industry has proved itself
the technological leader in several fields, notably metallurgy and heavy electrical equipment. Likewise, Japan, the EEC, and the United States each
can claim superiority in certain types of technical or managerial know-how.
Different systems of industrial organization apparently can lead to similar
levels of performance.
CONCLUSION

The major points developed in the preceding discussion are that (1)
predictions about the economic effects of conglomerate mergers cannot be
made on the basis of uncertain theory floating in a sea of factual detail;
(2) such predictions should allow for assessment of the influence which incisive structural changes can be expected to have on business conduct (assuming changes in the institutions and traditions of a given national
economy are usually slower in pace); and (3) the degree in which the anticipated behavioral changes will affect the long-run performance of firms
must be assessed, again, without losing sight of the limitations to optimum
technical achievement set by the social and political environment.
As regards the public policy towards conglomerate mergers in the
16 R. NELSON, M. PECK & E. KALACHECK, TECHNOLOGY, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND PUBLIC
POLICY 71 (1968).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

United States, it is held that the prevention rather than the permission of
concentration should constitute the rule. This policy should prevail at least
until more theoretical light is shed on the issue or Congress amends the law
to include a "performance rule of reason" which would permit the courts
to weigh economic benefits against losses in competitiveness.
Meanwhile, some general rules should be developed for the application
of section 7 to mergers by leading firms 17 and also to spurts of minor mergers in closely related markets.' 8 Moreover, fresh attempts should be made
either to reinterpret or amend section 8 of the Clayton Act.
17 Such proposals have been advanced by Turner, supra note 11, and with a somewhat different emphasis by Campbell & Shepherd, Leading-Firm Conglomerate Mergers,
13 ANTITRUST BULL. 1361-82 (1968).
18 It appears that the antitrust agencies and the Supreme Court are far more concerned about the cumulative effect of a merger wave than their critics. See, e.g., Brown
Shoe and Mueller, The Celler-Kefauver Act: 16 Years of Enforcement, Staff Report to
the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee, in THE JOURNAL Or RE-

113-80 (1969).
The effects wrought by the unrestrained growth by merger of already large enterprises and by the short-circuiting of entire industry sectors into a few decision-making
clusters have not yet been analyzed sufficiently. A good deal more needs to be known in
this area, not only as regards conglomerate mergers but also looser forms of concentration. In a recent study, for example, P. C. Dooley suggests that as a result of multiple
personal ties large banks and investment institutions probably exert considerable influence on the merger activities of the 200 largest corporations in this country. Dooley, The
Interlocking Directorate, 59 Ari. ECON. REv. 314, 322 (1969). In Japan and the EEC the
web between financial and business interests appears to be stronger yet.
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